The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Weather Information and Display System was used to provide meteorological and atmospheric modeling/consequence assessment support to state and local agencies after the collision of two Norfolk Southern freight trains on the morning of January 6, 2005. This collision resulted in the release of several toxic chemicals to the environment, including chlorine. The dense and highly toxic cloud of chlorine gas that formed in the vicinity of the accident was responsible for 9 fatalities and caused injuries to more than 500 others. Transport model results depicting the forecast path of the ongoing release were made available to emergency managers in the county's Unified Command Center shortly after SRNL received a request for assistance. Support continued over the ensuing 2 days of the active response. The SRNL also provided weather briefings and transport/consequence assessment model results to responders from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, the Savannah River Site (SRS) Emergency Operations Center, Department of Energy headquarters, and hazard material teams dispatched from the SRS. Operational model-generated forecast winds used in consequence assessments conducted during the incident were provided at 2-km horizontal grid spacing during the accident response. High-resolution Regional Atmospheric Modeling System (RAMS, version 4.3.0) simulation was later performed to examine potential influences of local topography on plume migration in greater detail. The detailed RAMS simulation was used to determine meteorology using multiple grids with an innermost grid spacing of 125 m.
INTRODUCTION
On January 6, 2005, at ϳ2:40 a.m., a Norfolk Southern freight train traveling northbound through the town of Graniteville, SC, collided with a second freight train parked on an industrial rail spur, resulting in the rupture of rail cars transporting liquefied chlorine and other industrial chemicals. The subsequent rapid discharge of Յ70 t of chlorine quickly produced a dense airborne cloud of toxic gas and aerosols that spread throughout property occupied by a textile mill and into adjacent areas of town, resulting in the deaths of 9 individuals, mainly mill workers, and injuries to Ͼ500 others. 1 Graniteville is located in west-central South Carolina a few kilometers west of Aiken, SC, and 20 km north of the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS).
The threat of a rupture to additional tankers of chlorine that were damaged in the accident resulted in closure of businesses and the relocation of Ͼ5000 residents for Յ9 days, as crews worked to dispose of the remaining inventories. Hundreds of emergency workers from local volunteer fire departments, Aiken County sheriff and emergency management offices, the SRS, and state and federal agencies responded to the event. As part of a mutual aid agreement with Aiken County, the Atmospheric Technologies Group (ATG) of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) at SRS supported decision-makers in the county's Joint Operation Center with hazard consequence modeling and meteorological assessments over the 2-day period of active response.
The SRS is an 800-km 2 (310-mi 2 ) nuclear facility owned by the U.S. Department of Energy and operated by the Washington Savannah River Company. The SRS is located in Western South Carolina, ϳ20 km south of Aiken, bordered on the west by the Savannah River (Figure 1) . Established in 1950, the SRS produced radionuclides in support of the nation's defense and currently operates programs supporting nuclear nonproliferation, disposition of radiological and chemical waste, and environmental remediation.
The meteorological program developed and operated by SRNL supports SRS operations in the areas of emergency response, compliance with regulatory requirements for employee and public health and safety, and the design and licensing of facilities supporting current and future SRS missions. The SRNL also conducts work in the atmospheric sciences for other federal government agencies. Components of the meteorological program at SRNL include a comprehensive tower-based atmospheric measurement program, 2 or mesonet, a fully equipped weather forecast center, which provides access to local and worldwide weather data, and advanced atmospheric modeling capabilities that provide operational numerical weather forecasts and atmospheric consequence assessments for emergency response and nonproliferation.
The focus of this paper is on the technical aspects of hazard consequence modeling conducted by SRNL during and after the response to the Graniteville accident and the benefits of leveraging unique technical resources that may be available in the regional area to support local officials responsible for protecting public health and safety during hazardous materials incidents.
BACKGROUND
The SRNL's Weather Information and Display (WIND) System 3 provides a comprehensive, automated resource for conducting consequence assessment modeling during emergency response. The WIND System accesses a variety of real-time sources of local, national, and international meteorological information. Meteorological data collected from a local tower network (mesonet) are available in real-time. A continuous satellite-based feed from a private sector service is used to obtain regional, national, and international data from the National Weather Service (NWS) and other government agencies.
The backbone of the WIND System is a cluster of UNIX workstations that gather local and regional data from the mesonet and satellite feed and archive these data into a relational database. Meteorological observations are extracted from the database every 15 min and downloaded, along with forecast data from operational runs of a prognostic mesoscale model, to desktop computers. A suite of consequence assessment models residing locally on these computers can then be run with a combination of the local observations and forecasts to generate the real-time predictions of plume transport and associated hazards.
In 1996, the SRNL established mutual aid agreements with five counties surrounding the SRS, 4 including Aiken County, SC. These agreements delineated three areas of collaboration through which WIND System resources could be leveraged to enhance regional emergency response programs: (1) assistance from SRNL in establishing meteorological monitoring stations in critical areas of need; (2) custom WIND System software for use by county officials in conducting local consequence assessments using observations from the local meteorological mesonet; and (3) providing technical assistance to the county's emergency management team during a real-time response to events such as the Graniteville accident.
WIND System Components
Meteorological Measurements. The mesonet of meteorological monitoring stations currently incorporated into WIND System operation is illustrated in Figure 1 . Towers located adjacent to each of the SRS's eight major operational areas are instrumented to measure wind speed, wind direction, turbulence, temperature, and moisture at an elevation of 61 m above ground level. A ninth tower located near the center of the SRS collects similar data at four levels up to a height of 61 m. The ATG also operates instrumentation on a nearby television tower facility for measurements of wind, temperature, and moisture at 30, 61, and 304 m. Every 15 min, tower observations are transmitted to the UNIX workstation cluster and archived. In support of the mutual aid agreements, an additional four monitoring stations were installed in Augusta, GA. Measurements of wind and temperature at these four sites are collected at a single level with heights ranging from 10 -60 m above ground. In total, there are 14 stations located within a 25-km radius of Graniteville with variable spacing of 3-15 km between them. Terrain in the general area that includes Graniteville and the SRS consists of low-rolling, forested hills. Most of the sites in the mesonet are generally free from any adverse influence of topography, and measurements are taken at an elevation that is well above the forest canopy. Consequently, wind data from the mesonet are typically expected to accurately represent conditions throughout the region. One exception may occur during highly stable conditions at night when terrain-induced drainage flows can occur in shallow valleys (Graniteville is located in such a valley). Measurements from the regional mesonet are supplemented by Southeastern U.S. surface observations and upper-air soundings from the NWS. There are two NWS surface stations within 30 km of Graniteville (Augusta's Bush and Daniel Field). However, these stations do not reliably represent the flow features at Graniteville.
Meteorological Forecasts. The ATG has configured a prognostic atmospheric model, the Regional Atmospheric Modeling System 5 (RAMS), to generate routine three-dimensional forecasts of meteorological conditions throughout the Central Savannah River Area (CSRA) of Georgia and South Carolina and much of the Southeast United States. Detailed 6-hr forecasts of wind speed, direction, turbulence, and other meteorological variables are generated every 3 hr for a region encompassing the CSRA with an inner horizontal grid spacing of 2 km. In addition, regional 36-hr forecasts using RAMS at a 10-km grid spacing are generated every 12 hr for an area that includes much of Georgia and South Carolina.
For the local simulations used during the train accident, the initial conditions were provided by the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) Rapid Update Cycle (RUC) model. 6 The modeling of surface conditions requires land-use features such as topography, vegetation type, and soil type. Variable input soil moisture conditions are also used. Topography data are obtained from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) at varying resolutions, whereas the vegetation data are also USGS products based on the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index. The soil type assumed here is sandy clay loam, whereas the variable soil moisture input is obtained from the NCEP Eta Data Assimilation System model at ϳ40 km resolution. The model's lowest atmospheric level is at 20 m above ground. This grid system is designed for emergency response needs at the SRS (centered at 33.256°N, 81.750°W), located to the south-southeast of Graniteville by 30 km (Figure 2 ). Graniteville is located within the inner, higher-resolution domain.
Atmospheric Transport and Consequence Assessment Models.
ATG maintains a suite of transport and dispersion models available for assessing consequences of hazardous materials released to the environment. These models are tailored to support a broad range of assessment needs during the early and intermediate phase of response. Two of these models (Puff/Plume and Lagrangian Particle Dispersion Model [LPDM]) were used during the Graniteville response, whereas a more sophisticated non-SRNL model (Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability [HPAC]) was used during the postanalysis. Descriptions of each model follow.
Puff/Plume 7 is a segmented trajectory Gaussian dispersion model that provides decision-makers a rapid and conservative assessment as an initial estimate of potential downwind hazards from a chemical or radiological release. Puff or plume release trajectories are constructed for Յ12 hr of observed and forecast winds with results available in Ͻ1 minute. Output can also be exported for use with geographic information system software.
The LPDM 8 provides refined transport and dispersion analyses on local to regional scales. LPDM uses a threedimensional wind forecast by RAMS to account for complex wind patterns because of the effects of terrain and mesoscale phenomena, such as fronts. Although primarily configured to calculate dose and deposition for radiological releases, LPDM can be used to simulate the dispersion of any passive contaminant, such as trace or pollutant gases. The position of all particles is tracked by solving the Langevin stochastic differential equations for subgrid-scale turbulent velocities, 9 and atmospheric diffusion is modeled by a Markov chain process.
The HPAC is a software package developed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 10 HPAC is actually a suite of models that allows for various modes of release of radiological, chemical, and biological agents. HPAC generates interpolated meteorological data fields based on meteorology and transports the material using a transport and diffusion model (SCIPUFF 11, 12 ). SCIPUFF describes diffusion processes using second-order turbulence closure by relating the dispersion rate to velocity fluctuation statistics, and also provides variance in the concentration fields, allowing for a measure of uncertainty in the result.
It should be noted that although SRNL did not become actively involved in the response until several hours after the accident, Puff/Plume and LPDM were still used to assess an ongoing release consisting of mainly passive off-gassing of a residual inventory of chlorine remaining in the ruptured tanker. With its more robust handling of source term input and its ability to simulate dense gases, HPAC was used in postaccident analyses for detailed simulations of the release during the first 2-3 hr after the collision when the chlorine cloud likely exhibited dense gas behavior.
INCIDENT DESCRIPTION
As reported by the National Transportation Safety Board, 1 two trains collided in the town of Graniteville in the early morning of January 6, 2005. A stationary train sitting on a siding rail (spur) servicing a textile mill was struck by another train carrying a variety of hazardous chemicals, including liquid chlorine (Cl 2 ). The switching mechanism was inadvertently set to send trains to the spur, rather than to the main track northward and out of town. The accident occurred at 2:40 a.m. and resulted in the derailment and catastrophic breach to one of several 90-t cars containing the pressurized liquid Cl 2 . On contact with the atmosphere, the Cl 2 rapidly vaporized and became an airborne threat to the immediate vicinity. A detailed USGS map of Graniteville is shown in Figure 3 , and a photograph of the damage at the time of the incident is shown in Figure 4 . The figure illustrates the presence of numerous residences very near to the site of the collision. Table 1 provides a synopsis of the range of meteoro- Figure 5b indicates winds from the mesonet at 3:00 a.m.
a Expressed as a Pasquill-Gifford stability (turbulence) class. Classification is based on the standard deviation of horizontal wind direction fluctuations ( ) using a classification scheme recommended by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 14 logical conditions observed from the WIND System regional mesonet at the time of the accident. The southsouthwest wind that was observed throughout the mesonet and at NWS stations across the region was the result of clockwise flow around a surface high-pressure system centered off the Southeast U.S. coast. A map of synoptic conditions the morning of the accident 13 is shown in Figure 5a , whereas winds from the regional mesonet at 3:00 a.m. local time are shown in Figure 5b . The observed conditions given in Table 1 and Figure 5 are believed significant to the subsequent behavior of the chlorine cloud.
The uniform nature of observed wind direction and speed across all of the stations in the mesonet suggested that synoptic scale pressure gradients generally were likely sufficient to overcome possible microscale flows driven by local terrain. Observed wind speeds and turbulence intensities were greater than is often observed in winter during the early morning hours when very stable conditions are likely. In fact, measured values of turbulence intensity corresponded with an atmospheric stability that varied between neutral and weakly stable. 14 The uniformity of the observations and the lack of a strongly stable boundary layer provided the SRNL response team confidence that the regional wind observations were reasonably representative of conditions in the Graniteville area.
Furthermore, these meteorological conditions were probably sufficient to cause some turbulent mixing and steady erosion of contaminant along the periphery of the dense cloud that formed immediately after the crash and tank rupture. Subsequent passive transport of chlorine gas then occurred toward slightly higher terrain and less populated areas to the north-northeast of Graniteville. Television broadcasts shortly after dawn showed reasonably good visibility around the crash site, indicating that most of the initially compact dense cloud had been flushed from the shallow valley in which Graniteville is located. The turbulent transport and dispersion of this nighttime cloud likely reduced airborne concentrations of Cl 2 over the longer term (minutes to hours) and quite possibly could have reduced the number of casualties resulting from the accident.
Roughly 1 month after the incident occurred, two of the authors surveyed vegetation damage in the area. Vegetation can be damaged from exposure to chlorine concentrations as low as 0.1-5 ppm for Ն2 hr. 15 Visible damage to vegetation in the area is noted to have covered an area roughly oriented north-south along the shallow valley. The main vegetative damage occurred with pine trees and juniper bushes. 16 Photographs such as the ones shown in Figure 6 indicate bleaching of the pine trees (with subsequent death of some trees, such as that shown in Figure 6a ). Such visual evidence can be used to infer the spatial extent of the most concentrated portion of the plume. In particular, Figure 6b shows little or no damage to the tops of these pine trees, whereas the lower portions are adversely affected. This vertical extent of bleaching suggests that the highest concentrations of Cl 2 only extended a few tens of meters into the atmosphere.
Support During Incident
Real-Time Support. Consultations with the Aiken County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) began around 7:00 a.m. on the morning of January 6. Initially, the most significant challenge for the SRNL response team was the development of a source term that would provide an adequate basis for assessing protective action measures. Aiken County officials reported that the accident resulted in breaches to railcars containing chlorine, sodium hydroxide, and cresol. The chlorine was recognized as by far the most volatile and significant of the three substances with respect to potential airborne hazards. Based on reports of injuries and possible fatalities occurring during the predawn hours, the breach of the chlorine tanker was believed to have resulted in a rapid initial discharge and vaporization of most of the contents, followed by slow, steady off-gassing of a residual inventory in the tank. These assumptions were supported by television reports from the scene, which showed no significant venting of a visible chlorine plume or substantially reduced visibility at the scene.
Aiken County officials initially implemented an evacuation order during the predawn for all of the residents within a default 1.6-km (1-mi) radius of the incident scene. Therefore, the primary objective for consequence modeling at the time of the SRNL activation was to support a reassessment of the initial evacuation order with respect to the subsequent ongoing release from residual off gassing. In a situation with only limited incident scene information, the SRNL uses a default source term to allow for a preliminary atmospheric transport assessment to be conducted. As better data are obtained, refinements to the source term and subsequent model runs are made. Although modeled airborne concentrations are highly uncertain, valuable information on transport of any hazardous materials can quickly be assessed. In this case of secondary off gassing from a rail car accident, an arbitrary default source term of 0.454 kg/sec (60 lb/min) assigned by Puff/Plume was used as a release rate. Although this release rate is much less than default values that would be applicable to the initial discharge, it was believed to represent a reasonable value for an off-gassing scenario.
The first Puff/Plume transport model calculation, shown as Figure 7 , was posted to an external Web site for access by officials at Aiken County's Unified Command Center around 8:00 a.m. Although highly uncertain, results showed that predicted downwind concentrations greater than the Emergency Response Planning Guide Level 2 (ERPG-2) threshold of 3 ppm extended no more than 1.6 km (1 mi) downwind of the accident site. The ERPG levels for chemicals are developed by the American Industrial Hygiene Association. 17 The ERPG-2 values are the consensus standard for implementing measures to protect industrial workers and the public and represent a concentration below which nearly all individuals could be exposed for Յ1 hr without developing severe or irreversible health effects.
Discussions continued through the morning with Aiken County EMA and with representatives from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SC-DHEC) to begin evaluating the accuracy of the first model calculation and refine the assumptions on source term. Unsubstantiated reports by motorists along Interstate 20, ϳ20 km north of the incident, indicated that odors had been noted; however, SC-DHEC reported no evidence of detectable levels of chlorine in areas downwind of the immediate incident scene after daylight. These reports provided the SRNL assessment team increased confidence that the chosen release rate was reasonably conservative with respect to the ongoing residual off gassing.
By 9:00 a.m., results were available from an LPDM simulation of downwind transport using RAMS forecasts of local winds based on initial conditions from the RUC model at 1:00 a.m. The forecast period covered by LPDM encompassed 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. RAMS forecasts for the Graniteville area showed winds that were consistent with the regional observations from the mesonet and indicated a persistence of the south-southwest wind throughout the day (Figure 8 ). NWS and SRNL mesonet observations of winds during the day verified this RAMS forecast. Animation of LPDM results based on the RAMS forecast showed a corresponding north-northeast transport of the residual chlorine release that remained west of more densely populated areas near the city of Aiken.
After the initial accident support, the SRNL team continued to provide ongoing support as follows. First, updates of Puff/Plume consequence assessment model output for the ongoing residual release using observed and forecasted meteorological conditions were posted to the external Web site for use by Aiken County and SC-DHEC approximately every 2 hr. Second, Briefings were made for local and state officials on consequence modeling results and forecasts of meteorological conditions expected for the upcoming 12-24 hr period. Third, Puff/Plume model results were shown to core staff in the SRS Emergency Operations Center (EOC), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) headquarters EOC, and the DOE liaison with the Department of Homeland Security.
By midday on January 7, responders at the incident scene began to plan recovery actions for the ruptured tanker, as well as for Ն1 additional chlorine tanker that had been damaged during the collision. One disposition alternative being considered was to physically lift the two damaged tankers from the wreckage and remove them from the scene. Because of concern that such actions could result in an additional catastrophic rupture, Aiken County requested SRNL to estimate possible downwind consequences resulting from the postulated release of the entire contents of the chlorine tanker in question.
Puff/Plume results for this scenario, using meteorological conditions forecasted for that afternoon, showed an area of potentially life-threatening effects (greater than the ERPG-3 concentration of 20 ppm) to a distance of 5 km from the crash site and potentially irreversible severe effects (greater than the ERPG-2 concentration of 3 ppm) to a distance of Ͼ20 km from the site (Figure 9 ). Furthermore, winds had shifted to a direction that would transport the contaminant more toward the city of Aiken and impact a nearby hospital and other sensitive facilities. SRNL also forecasted stable conditions to occur during the following night, and such conditions would likely have led to higher airborne concentrations of Cl 2 in the immediate vicinity over greater periods of time. Model results for this scenario were posted to the external Web site and provided to Aiken County as a geographic information system layer for display on the Unified Command Center mapping system. These results led to a decision to defer recovery actions involving movement of the damaged tankers. Eventually, teams were able to reach the tanker and siphon the remaining chlorine inventory onto undamaged tankers that were brought to the scene.
Postanalysis
Given the complexity of a dense gas release in a valley resulting from the Graniteville train crash, a much higher resolution simulation was conducted in an attempt to capture the near-surface wind fields very near the crash site. The original two-grid system (Figure 2 ) was modified to incorporate a third and fourth nested grid at 500-and 125-m horizontal grid spacing, respectively. In addition, the vertical grid spacing was reduced such that the lowest vertical level above ground for the two outer grids was ϳ15 m AGL, whereas for the inner two grids it was 7 m AGL (resulting in 14 atmospheric levels Ͻ300 m).
RUC data are available at 3-hr intervals. Beginning at 1:00 p.m., January 5, 2005, these data were used to create initial and lateral boundary conditions in RAMS. Fineresolution topography (100 m) from USGS digital elevation maps was used for topography. Figure 10 shows the topographic heights for the 500-and 125-m horizontal grids used in the simulations. The feature of particular interest is the valley where the accident occurred and the steeper terrain located just to the east. The northwestern part of the city of Aiken is located just to the east and southeast of this feature.
There were no meteorological observations taken in the vicinity of the crash site. The closest near-surface measurements were taken at a tower located on the SRS complex and two NWS sites located at Daniel (DNL) and Bush Field (AGS) airports in Augusta, GA. Unfortunately, most likely none of these is totally representative of actual wind conditions in the valley at the time of the incident, but they are valuable for understanding the synoptic flow of the region. The nearby station locations considered in the analyses for this paper are given in Table 2 and also noted in Figure 2 .
As noted previously, observations from the SRNL mesonet during the incident showed that surface wind speeds were greater than the near-calm conditions that frequently occur during the early morning hours this time of year. Nonetheless, the detailed simulation indicated that surface winds near the crash site were sufficiently light (Ͻ2 m/sec) to allow for minor channeling through the valleys of Graniteville at the time of the accident. Wind speeds increased to ϳ2.5 m/sec by sunrise (7:00 a.m.) and to 4 m/sec by midafternoon (3:00 p.m.). The direction was generally from the south-southwest or southwest during the entire period.
Vertical cross-sections of various meteorological variables (vertical velocity [meters per second], turbulent kinetic energy [square meters per square second], potential temperature [kelvin], and relative humidity (RH) [percent]) over the lowest 600 m of the atmosphere along a west-to-east orientation intersecting the train collision location are shown in Figure 11 for a time of 3:00 a.m. The location of the train accident is indicated by the arrow. Vertical velocities were very light near the crash site with low turbulence levels. Potential temperature profiles indicated a weakly stratified atmosphere, and humidity levels were very high (ϳ100%). For the dense gas-behaving chlorine cloud, sufficiently light wind coupled with slightly downward air motion near the surface would support gravity-driven flow.
Surface wind speeds increased by sunrise, and the depth of the boundary layer began to grow (Figure 12 ). By 11:00 a.m., vertical velocity was simulated to be upward at the crash site, and the boundary layer depth had grown to between 300 and 400 m. Note that large-scale models provide similar boundary layer depth estimates during this time. Unfortunately, there were no special soundings or other specialized equipment (i.e., SODAR [sonic detection and ranging]) taken during the incident with which to compare simulated midday estimates. The nearest NWS upper-air stations at Atlanta, GA, and Charleston, SC, located ϳ200 km west and southwest, respectively, only take soundings twice per day at 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. The atmospheric moisture content had also begun to drop because of daytime heating and convective mixing in the boundary layer. This would also support reports that the cloud had dispersed by this time. Time-series plots of wind speed and direction were generated for the period 2:30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., January 6, and interpolated to the observation locations discussed previously. In addition, simulated wind speed and direction as interpolated to the surface level (10 m AGL) in Graniteville at the crash site are also plotted. All of the simulated values (except Graniteville) were taken from meteorology generated on grid 2. Values were taken from this grid, because the extent of the finer grids did not reach either the SRS or Augusta. Comparisons of wind direction and wind speed are given in Figure 13 .
At the time of the collision, all three of the observation sites indicated winds from the south-southwest to southwest, although DNL was closer to 225°, whereas the other stations were closer to 200°. Directions were generally uniform throughout the period, with slight veering to 240°by late day (5:00 p.m.). Simulated values were generally within 20°to 40°of the observations, although early morning values at SRS indicated a more southerly component. As expected, simulated values at Graniteville lie within values obtained from all of the measurement sites.
Observed wind speeds ( Figure 13b ) were all ϳ3 m/sec at the time of the accident, before peaking at ϳ8 m/sec by late afternoon. The simulated trends follow along these lines, although values between 2:30 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. at the airports were Ͻ2 m/sec. Simulated wind speeds at Graniteville steadily rose from 1 m/sec at the time of the crash to a maximum of 4.5 m/sec by 2:00 p.m. before tailing off later in the afternoon.
HPAC was used to simulate the effects of the dense gas very near the release location. An industrial transport accident was assumed for a tanker containing ϳ20,000 gal of Cl 2 . A major rupture was assumed to occur instantaneously expelling Ͼ62,000 kg of chlorine gas in both vapor and aerosol phase. This source term is consistent with the NTSB estimate of a release of ϳ70 t. Dense gas calculations were made within HPAC, and appropriate median lethal (LCt) and incapacitating (ICt) concentration levels, as well as ERPG levels, were then determined. Figure 14 illustrates the plume footprint 1 hr after the crash using the 500-m resolution RAMS winds, with detailed road overlays and the approximate location of deaths that occurred as a result of the accident. Because terrain near the site is actually lower to the southwest of the crash site, the relatively light winds coupled with gravity-driven spreading of the dense gas explains why several deaths occurred southwest (upwind) of the wreck, although winds were simulated (and observed) to be blowing weakly from the southwest toward the northeast at the time of the crash.
The simulations appear to be reasonable in one other way. Also shown in Figure 14 (dark bold line) is an approximate outline of visible damage to vegetation in the area described earlier. The resulting footprint compares favorably with both vegetation damage and the locations of deaths that occurred as a result of the incident.
CONCLUSIONS
The SRNL's WIND System, a real-time consequence assessment resource for emergency response, performed as designed to provide timely support to Aiken County and state of South Carolina officials responding to the Norfolk Southern rail accident in Graniteville. Results were used to reassess the appropriateness of initial protective actions for the surrounding community and to plan incident scene recovery actions. The value of SRNL's support to local emergency managers was noted in subsequent newspaper reports. 18 Furthermore, experience gained from the Graniteville response clearly demonstrates that local/regional consequence assessment assets can play a valuable role during hazardous material incidents of local and even national significance by providing nearly full-time, customized support targeted directly to local decision-makers.
Detailed numerical simulations of meteorology during the Graniteville train collision were generated using the mesoscale RAMS model nested with four grids of horizontal spacing at 8, 2, 0.5, and 0.125 km. The lowest vertical level above ground was 7 m. Simulated fields compare well with nearby observations, with transport for the first day indicating a plume directed between north and northeast.
Interestingly, although the chlorine cloud was more dense than air, the synoptic winds were strong enough at the time of the accident (3:00 a.m.) to greatly minimize the gravity driven flow into the upwind, shallow valley. In addition, turbulent mixing was sufficient to cause significant transport of the plume over slightly higher terrain to the north and northeast. Use of a dense gas model to simulate localized effects indicates agreement with fatalities in the immediate area and visible damage to vegetation. 
